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INTRODUCTION 
Societies do not grow and prosper without entrepreneurs. The history of all rich societies is ripe 
with entrepreneurs: Julius Caesar’s friend Balbus went to Rome from a far-away province (Spain) 
and worked his way up through the ranks to become one of the richest people in the Empire, and on 
his way built both theatres and baths. Thomas Edison’s inventions both made him one of the most 
famous people of his age and brought electric light and many other modern appliances to ordinary 
people. And in more recent years, Bill Gates founded one of the world’s largest personal fortunes 
by bringing the computer age into people’s homes. Common to these three individuals and 
countless other less known are entrepreneurial ability and will. And while culture may vary, it is 
arguable that the particular characteristics of entrepreneurship are anthropological constants (Mises, 
1949; Kirzner, 1997; Russell and Rath, 2002).  
 Yet, we observe rather large differences in entrepreneurial activity across countries and time, 
particularly if entrepreneurship is proxied by such measures as self-employment, new firm 
formation and the like (Blau, 1987; Blanchflower, 2000). Some countries are ripe with 
entrepreneurs who found firms in many different industries (e.g., United States), while in others 
new firm formation is more of an exception (e.g., Sweden). In this paper, we try to explain such 
cross-country differences by differences in economic policy and institutional design. Specifically, 
we use the well-known economic freedom (Freedom of the World) indices (Gwartney and Lawson, 
2005) to find out which elements of economic policy making and the institutional framework are 
responsible for the supply of entrepreneurs and the level of entrepreneurship in societies. Our data 
on entrepreneurship are derived from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(http://www.gemconsortium.org), a research consortium that collects cross-national data on 
numerous aspects of entrepreneurship.  The combination of these two datasets is unique in the 
literature.  
 In the last two to three decades, interest in institutions (Dixit, 1996; North, 1990), growth 
(Romer, 1990), and entrepreneurship (Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos, 1990; Baumol, 1993) 
has strongly increased in economics (although roughly speaking, interest in institutions and growth 
is still much larger than interest in entrepreneurship; cf. Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005). In 
particular, the intersections between these three areas have been fertile areas of research. Thus, 
much of recent growth theory has been concerned with exploring cross-country links betweens 
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institutions (and economic policies) and growth (e.g., Olson, 1982; Barro, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 
1997), and there has also been some interest in linking entrepreneurship and growth (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Carree and Thurik, 
2002).   
 Less interest appears to have devoted to the issue of how institutions and economic policy 
impact the level of entrepreneurship,1 arguably because of the well known difficulties of modelling 
the entrepreneurial function and measuring the incidence and effects of entrepreneurship (cf. 
Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005). However, this may be seen as a lacunae in the literature to the extent 
that the link from the institutional framework and economic policies to growth is mediated by 
entrepreneurial activity.2 In Israel Kirzner’s terms, the entrepreneur is the “prime mover of 
progress” (Kirzner, 1980), and neglecting the entrepreneur implies a neglect of an important 
mechanism in the growth process.  
 The design of the paper is the following. First, we outline some existing theories of 
entrepreneurial activity. Most economic theories of entrepreneurship are extremely abstract and do 
not enter into specific discussions of the institutional and economic policy determinants of 
entrepreneurship. Accordingly, we provide such a discussion.  Secondly, we report a set of cross-
country regressions that explain various measures of entrepreneurship and innovation in terms of 
variables drawn from the economic freedom indices. Finally, we discuss the findings and conclude 
with a set of policy recommendations for countries wanting to increase their entrepreneurial 
dynamism.  
 In sum, the contribution of this paper is to empirically examine the institutional and economic 
policy determinants of entrepreneurship and innovation, using datasets that while enjoying 
widespread use individually have not hitherto been brought together in a single analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
1 However, see Audretsch, Thurik and Verheul (2002) for some cross-country comparisons and Kreft and Sobel (2005) 
for cross-state comparisons in a US context. 
2  This is not entirely unproblematic, because, as argued by Baumol (1990), entrepreneurship may well be unproductive 
and even destructive. For example, entrepreneurship may be exercised in criminal or rent-seeking activities. However, 
Baumol assumes that the supply of entrepreneurship is constant (while its allocation over productive, unproductive and 
destructive activities may differ). Clearly, this is a strong assumption, and there are strong reasons to assume that the 
supply of entrepreneurship is in fact dependent on the returns to entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1985; Henreksson, 2005). 
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THEORIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
The Phenomenon of Entrepreneurship 
 Because entrepreneurs in many ways personify market forces, one might expect entrepreneurs to 
be the central figures in economics, that is, to be recognized as “the single most important player in a 
modern economy” (Lazear, 2002: 1). As numerous writers ⎯ from Hayek (1946) over Baumol (1968) 
to Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) ⎯ have lamented, the real world importance of entrepreneurs is, 
however, not reflected in economic theorizing. Yet, what is usually seen as the founding 
contribution to the economics of entrepreneurship, Richard Cantillon’s (1755) Essai sur la nature 
de commerce en géneral (1755), actually precedes the Wealth of Nations by more than two decades, 
and many different conceptions of entrepreneurship have been developed in the economics 
literature. In the following, we briefly survey these.3  
 Entrepreneurship as management. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of many business 
schools, the phenomenon under investigation has often been “small-business management.” 
Entrepreneurs are pictured as the managers of small, family-owned businesses or start-up 
companies. Entrepreneurship consists of routine management tasks, relationships with venture 
capitalists and other sources of external finance, product development, marketing, and so on. 
Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be practically meaningless as 
it appears to include virtually all aspects of small or new business management, while excluding the 
identical tasks when performed within a large or established business.  Put differently, if 
entrepreneurship is simply a set of management activities, or any management activity that takes 
place within a particular type of firm, then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to 
those activities.   
 Entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly within the 
management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, daring, imagination, or 
creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  These accounts emphasize the 
personal, psychological characteristics of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship, in this conception, is 
                                                 
3 More extensive discussions can be found in Barretto (1989), Praag (1999), Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) and Foss 
and Klein (2005).   
  
 4
not a necessary component of all human decision-making, but a specialized activity that some 
individuals are particularly well equipped to perform.4  
 Entrepreneurship as innovation. The most cited conception of entrepreneurship in economics 
is Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innovator (e.g., Segerstrom et al., 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992; Baumol, 1993). Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new combinations”— 
new products, production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — 
shaking the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter termed “creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter, 1911). Realizing that the entrepreneur has no place in the general-
equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schumpeter greatly admired, Schumpeter gave the 
entrepreneur a role as the source of economic change.5 Schumpeter carefully distinguished the 
entrepreneur from the capitalist (and strongly criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing 
the two).  His entrepreneur need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business 
firm at all. In Schumpeter’s conception, “people act as entrepreneurs only when they actually carry 
out new combinations, and lose the character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their 
business, after which they settle down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund 
and Hébert, 1990: 569). Thus, even if by innovating the entrepreneur succeeds in establishing a 
monopoly that give rise to indefinite returns, “… the flow of gains to the entrepreneur in her 
entrepreneurial role must be very temporary” (Baumol, 1993: 7).  
 Entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery. The perhaps strongest competitor to the 
Schumpeterian conception is the notion of entrepreneurship as “alertness” to profit opportunities. 
While present in Cantillon’s and J. B. Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been 
elaborated most fully by Israel Kirzner (e.g., 1997). Kirzner follows Hayek (1968) in describing 
competition as a discovery process:  the source of entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight — the 
discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technology) unknown to other market 
participants. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers a discrepancy in present 
prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a 
new product or a superior production process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. 
                                                 
4 Note that the relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract on the market by purchasing 
consulting services, project management, and the like.  A “non-entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can 
manage the day-to-day operations of the firm, purchasing entrepreneurial services on the market as needed.  Moreover, 
the literature does not explain clearly whether imagination and creativity are necessary, sufficient, or incidental 
conditions for entrepreneurship.  Clearly the founders of many firms are imaginative and creative.  If not, are they not 
entrepreneurs? 
5 This includes, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
  
 5
Success, in this view, comes not from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from 
having some knowledge or insight that no one else has — that is, from something beyond the given 
optimization framework.6  
 Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities.  
Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. Critics have seized on this as a defect in 
Kirzner’s conception. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not 
sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to 
realize the discovered profit opportunity.  Moreover, excepting the few cases where buying low and 
selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of currencies or commodity futures), 
even arbitrage transactions require some time to complete. The selling price may fall before the 
arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss. In 
Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an 
existing profit opportunity.  Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break even, but it is unclear how 
they suffer losses. 
 Entrepreneurship as judgment. An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.  
Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let 
alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight [1921] terms 
uncertainty, rather than probabilistic risk). Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, 
and leadership. Judgment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as 
well as new ventures. While alertness tends to be passive, judgment is active. Entrepreneurs “are 
those who seek to profit by actively promoting adjustment to change. They are not content to 
passively adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that have already 
occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an opportunity to meliorate their 
own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate and exploit it” (Salerno, 1993: 123). Those 
who specialize in judgmental decision-making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need 
not possess these traits. Decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves 
imagination, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 
                                                 
6 Kirzner’s view of superior foresight differs from Stigler’s concept of search in which the value of new knowledge is 
known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search costs. “Stigler's searcher decides how much 
time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy drawers looking for a sketch which (the family 
recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec. Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures 
which have been hanging in the same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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 A definition of entrepreneurship. Drawing on the above contributions to the economics of 
entrepreneurship, and echoing (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999: 46-7), we define “entrepreneurship as 
the manifest ability and willingness of individuals” to perceive new economic opportunities and to 
introduce their ways of seizing these opportunities into the market in the face of uncertainty. 
Following Schumpeter, these opportunities may consist in new products, new processes, new modes 
of organization, and new product-market combinations. Individuals may exercise this ability and 
willingness on their own, as manager/owners of firms, as intrapreneurs within firms, and as part of 
teams inside firms.  They do so by making uncertain decisions on the deployment of valuable 
resources. In sum, we define entrepreneurship as a behavioral characteristic of persons.  However, 
this behavioral characteristic is usually very difficult to measure, and hence empirical research tends 
to rely on what is essentially outcomes of this characteristic, such as new firm formation.  
Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
 The above summaries of the classical contributions to the economics of entrepreneurship 
suggest several immediate determinants of entrepreneurship. Thus, Schumpeter and Knight both 
focus on determinants that are inherent to potential entrepreneurs such as the degree to which a 
person is “venturesome” (Knight, 1921) or has the “ambition” and “intelligence” to exercise 
“leadership” (Schumpeter, 1911).  In contrast, there is little specificity in the classical contributions 
on the institutional and economic policy prerequisites for (successful) entrepreneurship. Both 
Knight and Schumpeter stress the availability of credit. Schumpeter (1911) also links the exercise of 
entrepreneurship to the supply of other opportunities for social distinction, and in his 1942 he 
embeds entrepreneurship in a broad socio-cultural theory.  
 However, one seeks in vain in the classical statements for more precise discussions of the 
institutional and economic policy antecedents to entrepreneurial activity, perhaps because the notion 
⎯ now entirely commonplace ⎯  that institutions imply systems of incentives was not an 
integrated part of economics at the time when Schumpeter and Knight wrote. Moreover, state 
apparatuses did not have anything like the size they do in contemporary welfare states, so it is 
understandable that the classical contributions neglected this (Schumpeter [1942] as a partial 
exception). 
 An exception is constituted by the (admittedly much more recent) work of Kirzner (1985). 
Kirzner (1985: 11) argues that the opportunity of profit switches on entrepreneurial alertness. Price 
discrepancies, representing profit opportunies, are “flashing red lights” that alert entrepreneurs to 
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pockets of ignorance in the market. By closing these pockets, that is, exploiting gains from trade 
that no one else had realized existed, entrepreneurs equilibrate the market. However, the signaling 
system of the market can be hampered in various ways. Thus, Kirzner argues that government 
intervention, such as minimum prices, price ceilings, and outright nationalization destroys the 
informational signaling process of the market. Government intervention which aims to improve 
market outcomes is based on the usually fallacious presumption that government bureaucrats know 
in advance what the market will reveal. In addition to this fundamental knowledge problem comes 
the motivational problem that government bureaucrats, unlike entrepreneurs, do not have sufficient 
incentives to discover the correct prices.  Thus, government intervention in general hampers the 
entrepreneurial discovery process, and hinders its welfare-improving consequences. 
Institutional Determinants of Entrepreneurship  
 How institutions affect the supply and quality of entrepreneurial efforts, as well as how it 
affects whether entrepreneurship is associated with commercial success, has been a relatively 
under-researched area in the mainstream economics. To be sure, much applied research in small 
business economics, economic geography, innovation studies, etc. has dealt with how institutions 
and economic policy influence small firm formation and the rate of innovation, and much of this 
work has an obvious bearing on understanding the determinants of entrepreneurship.   
 The set of possible determinants of entrepreneurship is very large indeed, including the size of 
the government, the degree of administrative complexity/bureaucracy, the tax environment, the 
intellectual property rights regime, the enforcement of property rights in general, the level of trust, 
competition law, political freedom, labor laws, social security regime, bankruptcy law, corruption, 
crime, the ethnic composition of the population, availability of finance capital, etc. Some of these 
have been examined in previous work (e.g., Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1997; Grilo and Thurik, 
2003). In the following we discuss those determinants that can be related to the notion of “economic 
freedom,” a composite construct that includes such components that all ultimately boil down to the 
security and extent of property rights, but include, for example, the freedom to save, change jobs, 
contractual freedom, to keep income, etc. (see also Sobel, Clark and Lee, 2006).    
Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurship 
 Classical-liberal scholars have very often used the size of government in a broad sense ⎯ that 
is, the extent to which the government intervenes in the economy through government consumption, 
redistribution through transfer schemes, public investments, and marginal taxation ⎯  as a 
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satisfactory measure of economic freedom. There are many reasons why the size of government 
may be expected on apriori grounds to influence entrepreneurship.   
 Most directly, if economic activities in certain industries or sectors have essentially been 
nationalized, the scope for entrepreneurship is reduced, as nationalization often (but of course not 
necessarily) implies a public monopoly. This is in most parts of the Western industrialized world 
clearly the case of such industries as child care, health care, and care of the elderly. More indirect 
governmental control, such as requirements that certain trades be certified, may also reduce 
entrepreneurial activity for example, because certification amounts to barriers to entry (Demsetz, 
1982).  
 To the extent that a large government is associated high levels of publicly financed provision 
of various services (e.g., care of the elderly, education, etc.) and with generous social security 
systems, the incentives to engage in entrepreneurial acts in order to make a living (what may be 
called “necessity entrepreneurship”) are reduced because a relatively high reservation wage is 
practically guaranteed. However, such schemes also reduce incentives for individual wealth 
formation which may be expected to negatively influence the level of entrepreneurial activity 
(Henreksson, 2005: 11). One reason has to do with entrepreneurial judgment being idiosyncratic 
and often hard to clearly communicate to potential investors (Knight, 1921). The entrepreneur may 
have to finance his venture himself, at least in the start-up phase. If individual wealth formation is 
reduced because of generous public transfer schemes, etc., this makes such financing difficult.  
Moreover, if entrepreneurs are only able to commit little personal capital to their entrepreneurial 
venture, their signal to potential outside investors concerning their commitment to the venture is 
correspondingly weaker.    
 A large government needs to be financed, ultimately by taxation. As Henrekson (2005: 9) 
rightly points out,  
[i]n order to analyze how the tax system impacts on entrepreneurial behaviour, it is not 
sufficient to focus on the taxation of owners of firms. To a large extent, the return on 
entrepreneurial effort is taxed as wage income. 
One reason is that parts of the income that accrue from closely held companies may be paid out as 
wage income (depending on the specific tax regime), and that entrepreneurial activity may be 
carried out by employees.  Rewards for entrepreneurial behaviour in firms (e.g., stock options, 
bonuses for suggesting improvements, etc.) are taxed as wage income.  Henrekson (2005: 14) also 
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points out a high level of taxation moves many household-related services out of the reach for 
entrepreneurial exploitation.: “… higher rates of personal taxation discourage the market provision 
of goods and services that substitute closely for home-produced services” (p.15).  
 A related, yet distinct, item in an overall measure of economic freedom relates to the 
enforcement of property rights, that is, the extent to which property rights are secure over time 
(North, 1990; Barzel, 2005). Huge literatures in economic history, intellectual property rights, and 
innovation stress the importance for entrepreneurial activity at the micro level and economic 
development at the macro level of property rights being well-defined and enforced.  If so, it should 
be expected that institutional features such as the quality of regulations and the judicial system 
affects overall level of entrepreneurial activity. 
 A third important item in an economic freedom measure arguably is sound money (Friedman, 
1962), in particular the rate and variability of inflation. While anticipations of future relative prices 
are important in general for economic decision makers, it is arguable that they matter particularly 
much for entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs are essentially speculators who receive a residual 
income (Knight, 1921; Kirzner, 1997). Inflation, and particularly erratic inflation “jams” the 
signalling effects of relative prices (Friedman, 1977). While this may be less of a problem for risk-
loving entrepreneurs, many entrepreneurs may well be risk-averse, particularly those who engage in 
necessity entrepreneurship or activity within well-developed sectors. 
 Finally, following Kirzner (1985) public regulation is an important item in an economic 
freedom measure that is relevant to explaining the prevalence of entrepreneurial activity. Arguably, 
regulations can both help and hinder entrepreneurs who need clear rules and predictable 
enforcement of those rules. On the other hand, excessive regulations impose burdens on all firms, 
not the least start-ups, that may be prohibitive. In addition, Baumol (1990) made the point that 
individuals operating in heavily regulated economic environment may have larger gains from 
engaging in rent-seeking activities within the public sector ― what he termed “destructive 
entrepreneurship” ― than in real economic activities. 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Data Sources, Variables, and Models 
 The data used in this study is drawn from three different sources and summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations 
TEA 8.0874 3.911 29 
TEAOPP 5.519 2.807 29 
TEANEC 2.095 1.836 29 
Log GDP 9.731 .584 29 
Postcommunist .103 .309 29 
Government size 5.449 1.548 29 
 Consumption, % of GDP 23.031 8.849 29 
 Transfers, % of GDP  15.961 6.908 28 
 Investment 11.844 6.515 18 
 Lack of taxation  4.586 2.151 29 
Legal quality 7.348 1.763 29 
Sound money 8.879 1.394 29 
International trade 7.821 .774 29 
Regulatory quality 6.241 .847 29 
 
 The dependent variables in the following are from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Consortium (GEM) 2001 dataset, a rich large-scale questionnaire survey conducted in 29 countries 
in representative samples of individuals between 18 and 64 years; in total, approximately 77,000 
respondents are included. The data contain answers to a large array of questions on both 
entrepreneurial activity, the reasons for the activities, how they were financed as well as a battery of 
background questions. We use three variables constructed from the data. The variables, aggregated 
at the country level, are:7  
• TEA denotes the level of total entrepreneurial activity, measured by the proportion of 
respondents in each country who answer that they engaged in the upstart of an economic 
activity – starting a firm - within the sampling period. As such, the variable measures all 
firm upstarts regardless of the type of firm and the reason for the activity. 
                                                 
7 For readers who may want to use the GEM database themselves, we use the variables denoted “tea01”, “tea01opp” 
and “tea01nec” to form our aggregate data. 
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Since the GEM database also includes questions on the reason why respondents may have started a 
firm of their own, we can distinguish between two broad types of entrepreneurial activity, 
“opportunity entrepreneurship” and “necessity entrepreneurship”. 
• TEAOPP is the proportion of the same sample who state that they have engaged in an 
activity for the reason that they perceive that it represents an economic opportunity to 
them (“opportunity entrepreneurship”); and  
• TEANEC is the proportion of the same sample who state that they engaged in an activity 
for the reason that they perceived it as “necessary”, probably in order to uphold a decent 
standard of living or, in developing countries, to be able to support their family (“necessity 
entrepreneurship”).  
 It should be stressed that we thus only measure the actual economic entrepreneurial activity 
through firm upstarts. Hence, it must be emphasized that we neither capture whatever 
entrepreneurial activity occurs within existing firms, nor do we in any way measure the potential 
activity that there may have been in a country, had barriers to such activity not been in place. It is 
nevertheless clear that there is a substantial amount of cross-country variation, even in a sample 
consisting of only 29 countries. The TEA data are distributed between a minimum of 2.9% of the 
sample population (Japan) to a maximum of 20.2% (Mexico); the opportunity index is distributed 
between 1.3% (Japan) and 13.3% (Mexico), while the necessity index is distributed between .2% 
(Denmark) and 6.8% (Mexico). The country-level data on entrepreneurship are summarized in 
Table 2. 
  
 12
Table 2. Countries Included in This Study 
Country TEA TEAOPP TEANEC Country TEA TEAOPP TEANEC
Argentina 9.6 5.3 4.1 Mexico 20.2 13.3 6.8 
Australia 12.1 9.9 1.9 Netherlands 4.8 4.0 0.3 
Belgium 3.4 2.6 0.6 New Zealand 15.2 12.4 2.5 
Brazil 12.9 7.8 5.3 Norway 7.0 5.9 0.2 
Canada 9.1 6.2 2.6 Poland 7.1 3.4 3.5 
Denmark 5.6 4.6 0.3 Portugal 6.6 5.1 1.4 
Finland 5.1 3.9 0.5 Russia 6.0 4.3 1.0 
France 4.3 2.1 0.9 Singapore 5.9 4.6 1.1 
Germany 5.8 4.1 1.4 South Africa 8.2 5.5 2.3 
Hungary 10.9 7.6 3.2 South Korea 13.4 7.2 5.2 
India 11.7 5.0 6.6 Spain 6.0 4.0 1.4 
Ireland 9.7 7.2 1.8 Sweden 4.9 4.0 0.6 
Israel 3.8 1.4 0.5 United Kingdom 5.2 3.5 0.9 
Italy 8.2 6.3 1.7 USA 9.1 7.8 1.2 
Japan 2.9 1.3 1.2     
 
 In the following, we control for the logarithm to GDP per capita, measured in purchasing 
power parity-adjusted US dollars and taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002). We 
also control for regional variations by including dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and 
the Middle East, Latin America, and the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia. 
 Finally, our policy variables are from the freedom data, assembled by the Canadian Fraser 
Institute and published annually in Gwartney and Lawson (2005). The economic freedom indices 
have been used in a large number of studies documenting, among other things, their substantial 
effects on economic growth rates (e.g. Berggren, 2003). In the use of this type of data in this 
context, we follow Kreft and Sobel (2005). We use all five sub-indices of economic freedom. These 
are: 
• Government size ⎯ which measures the extent to which the government intervenes in 
the economy through consumption, redistribution through transfer schemes, public 
investments, and marginal taxation. For this particular index, we alternatively split it 
into its four sub-components. 
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• Legal quality ⎯  which measures the protection and respect for the rights of people to 
their owl lives and rightfully acquired property. The legal quality index is composed of 
indicators of judicial independence, impartiality of the courts, protection of intellectual 
property rights, military interference in law and politics, and integrity of the legal 
system. 
• Sound money ⎯  which consists of the rate and variability of inflation and monetary 
controls, which is a measure of the consistency of monetary policy. 
• International trade ⎯ which measures the extent of trade and barriers to trade and 
capital flows, both through actual trade and investment flows and through indicators of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and capital. 
• Regulatory quality ⎯ which is composed of three sub-indices measuring the freedom 
from government regulations and controls in the labour market, financial markets, and 
the price controls in the markets for goods and services. These three areas are again 
composed of: 1) the impact of minimum wages, hiring and firing practices, the share 
of the labour force with wages set in centralized bargaining, the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, and the use of conscript military personnel; 2) the percentage 
of deposits held in privately owned banks, bank competition, percentage of credit 
extended to the private sector, and the extent of interest rate controls; and 3) price 
controls, administrative procedures that are obstacles to business, time spent with the 
bureaucracy, the ease of starting new businesses, and the necessity of irregular 
payments. 
Some Cross-Country Tests 
 We include these variables in a set of simple OLS regressions explaining either the full TEA 
scores or the TEAOPP or TEANEC variables; Table 3 shows the results of the regressions 
including all five areas of economic freedom. It also reports the results of using the robust 
regression technique, which iteratively downweighs potential outlier observations based on the size 
of their residuals. This alternative procedure thus tests whether results obtained by OLS can be 
generalized to the full 29-country sample or are driven by single countries, which is an especially 
important potential problem given our small sample size. The table shows that even with such a 
small sample, the specification does a fairly good job at explaining the variation. The explanatory 
power (R squared) varies between 40 and 83%, and all F-tests for joint inclusion of the specification 
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are significant, although the one for TEAOPP fails the 1% level. The inclusion of all five indices of 
economic freedom neither proves to a problem as indicated by the low variance inflation factor (see 
footnote of Table 3). 
Table 3. Macro Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity 
 TEA TEA TEAOPP TEAOPP TEANEC TEANEC 
 OLS RR OLS RR OLS RR 
Log GDP -3.909*** 
(1.325) 
-3.989* 
(2.144) 
-1.725 
(1.038) 
-1.706 
(1.495) 
  -2.413*** 
(.338) 
-2.547*** 
(.505) 
Postcommunist .863 
(1.318) 
.469 
(2.807) 
.886 
(1.136) 
.842 
(1.958)   
.378 
(.456) 
.308 
(.804) 
Government size 2.124*** 
(.692) 
2.321*** 
(.721) 
1.740*** 
(.404) 
1.712*** 
(.503) 
.558** 
(.243) 
.600*** 
(.210) 
Legal quality .434 
(.644) 
.797 
(.883) 
.491 
(.494) 
.741 
(.616)   
.062 
(.197) 
.111 
(.259) 
Sound money 2.077*** 
(.714) 
2.582 
(1.728) 
1.304*** 
(.493) 
1.729 
(1.205) 
.899*** 
(.213) 
.937*** 
(.247) 
International trade -1.255 
(.793) 
-1.840 
(1.144)    
-.787 
(.566) 
-1.131 
(.798) 
-.545** 
(.250) 
-.529* 
(.312) 
Regulatory quality -.785 
(1.670) 
-1.442 
(1.757) 
-.449 
(1.047) 
-.872 
(1.225) 
-.420 
(.565) 
-.596 
(.508) 
       
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R2 .526 - .409 - .832 - 
F statistic 4.11 2.52 2.94 2.22 14.86 11.24 
RMSE 2.740 - 2.196 - .766 - 
Note: all regressions include dummies for Asia, Sub-Saharan African, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the MENA 
region; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. The variance inflation factor is 3.76 in all OLS 
regressions. Note also that actual trade does not matter. 
 
 It is immediately apparent from the table that economic development is strongly and 
negatively associated with entrepreneurial activity. Hence, even though such activity forms an 
important determinant of the growth of income, it tends to decrease with the level of incomes. 
However, this relation is not significant for opportunity activity (TEAOPP) while being strongly so 
for necessity activity (TEANEC). As such, development seems to reduce the amount of 
entrepreneurial activity which is caused by the need to engage in such activity, which is the main 
reason for the latter type while not necessarily reducing the perceived opportunities. The table also 
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shows that, as of 2001, the post-communist countries do not deviate systematically from other 
comparable countries. Even though one might fear so, we do not find any sign of path dependency 
of a system that strongly discouraged private activity. 
 Turning to the policy variables, we first of all find that the size of government is strongly 
positively related to both total activity as well as the shares arising from opportunity or necessity. 
Remembering that a larger score on this index means less government intervention, this is quite 
clear evidence of a depressing effect of government activity, which we explore further in Table 4 
below. The estimate suggests a substantial effect, as a one standard deviation improvement results 
in a rise in entrepreneurial opportunity activity of roughly 85% of a standard deviation. Second, we 
fail to find any effects of legal quality, the freedom to trade internationally, or the extent of the 
regulatory framework.8 We do, however, also find evidence of a strong effect of having access to 
sound money on both the level of total activity as well as on opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship. Here, a one standard deviation improvement of sound money is associated with 
an increase of 53% of a standard deviation of TEAOPP and a 49% increase of TEANEC. The effect 
is evidently somewhat stronger for entrepreneurial activity based on the presumption of 
opportunity, yet it is not entirely robust to being estimated by robust regressions as the 
insignificance of sound money using either TEA or TEAOPP is due to the influence of the three 
richest countries in the sample. Once excluded, all results are significant and robust. The same 
result applies if we instead use the logarithm to the sound money index, which has the effect of 
allowing for larger effects of having very poor monetary consistency (low scores). The reason for 
this is most likely that once passed a certain threshold of economic development, virtually all 
countries have set up independent monetary authorities to ensure that citizens have access to stable 
and predictable money. As such, there is very little variation at the top of the sound money index, 
which prevents identification of an effect in relatively rich countries. 
 In sum, Table 3 shows substantial evidence for the effects of two types of economic freedom 
on the level of entrepreneurial activity. However, the government size index covers a fairly 
disparate set of sub-indices. We therefore split this index into its component parts in Table 4, in 
which we keep the logarithm to GDP, the post-communist dummy and the sound money index in 
the specification while excluding the three insignificant freedom indices. It should also be noted 
that for three of the four sub-indices, we use the underlying real data. Hence, “government 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that if we instead use actual trade volumes, which can also be obtained from the Penn World 
Tables, we obtain the same non-result as with the trade index from the Fraser Institute. 
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consumption” is measured as the share of government consumption in total consumption; transfers 
and subsidies as a percentage of total GDP; and public investment as a share of total investments. 
The exception is the (lack of marginal) taxation index, which we keep as an index since it includes 
both the size of marginal taxes as well as the share of the labour force that face the highest marginal 
tax rate. Again, the regressions do a fairly decent job of explaining the cross-country variation 
although the R squared is much larger when TEANEC is the dependent variable, which is due to the 
strong and significant impact of economic development.9
 This point is clear as (the logarithm to) GDP per capita is consistently significant with a very 
large coefficient in the first four columns while it only becomes significant in one of the four right-
hand side columns by coincidence. Again, the post-communist dummy is never significant, 
indicating that the Eastern European countries have rapidly come to resemble the rest of the Free 
World on this count. Likewise, sound money is significant throughout the table with both TEANEC 
and TEAOPP as the dependent variable. 
                                                 
9 Of course, we have also performed tests with the three constituent subindices – labour, credit and business regulations 
- forming the overall regulation variable. These results are not reported here as they show no association. Hence, the 
extent of regulations and controls in the labor market seems unassociated with entrepreneurship in this sample even 
though other studies have argued for a strong correlation (e.g. Kreft and Sobel, 2005). 
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Table 4. Effects of Specific Factors of Government Size 
 TEANEC TEANEC TEANEC TEANEC TEAOPP TEAOPP TEAOPP TEAOPP 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Log GDP -2.159*** 
(.279) 
-2.332*** 
( .596) 
-2.598*** 
(.488) 
-2.588*** 
(.394) 
.008 
(.782) 
-.746 
(1.324) 
-4.021* 
(2.335)  
-1.345 
(1.176) 
Postcommunist -.417 
(.775) 
.566 
(.654) 
2.334 
(1.602) 
.476 
(.491) 
-1.895 
(1.207) 
.619 
(1.687) 
9.514 
(6.458)   
.591 
(1.705) 
Sound money .706*** 
(.146) 
.659*** 
(.129) 
1.113*** 
(.378) 
.652*** 
(.122) 
1.015*** 
(.306) 
1.132*** 
(.513) 
  2.862* 
(1.534) 
1.007* 
(.537) 
Government:         
 Consumption, 
% of GDP 
-.104*** 
(.021) 
   -.282*** 
(.062) 
   
 Transfers, % 
of GDP  
 -.060 
(.038) 
   -.277** 
(.131) 
  
 Investment   -.106 
(.069) 
   -.019 
(.227) 
 
 Lack of 
taxation  
   .139 
(.093) 
   .549** 
(.272) 
Observations 29 28 18 29 29 28 29 29 
Adjusted R 
Square 
.874 .792 .786 .785 .353 .211 .109 .286 
F statistic 28.84 15.70 9.89 13.53 3.18 2.03 -  
RMSE .662 .863 1.001 .919 2.298 2.475 3.315 2.788 
Note: all regressions include dummies for Asia, Sub-Saharan African, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the MENA 
region. 
 
 Turning to the government size variables and starting in the four left-hand columns of Table 4, 
in which the necessity component of total entrepreneurial activity is the dependent variable, only 
one of the four underlying variables is significant.10 This variable, government consumption, may 
proxy for unemployment benefits and other welfare arrangements that lower the chances of having 
to set up a business out of necessity. 
 The results are different when we turn to the determinants of necessity entrepreneurship. First 
of all, the share of total consumption pertaining to the government sector has a strong negative 
                                                 
10 It is worth mentioning that the regressions with public investment contain many missing observations. If we attempt 
to substitute the missing observations with data from other sources, we get a negative association between necessity 
entrepreneurship and public investment, but no relation with opportunity activity. 
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influence on TEAOPP. The coefficient, which is almost three times larger than with TEANEC, 
indicates that a one standard deviation to government consumption in this sample would induce a 
loss of opportunity entrepreneurship of about 90% of a standard deviation. Second, the share of 
transfers and subsidies in total GDP also exerts a negative influence on TEAOPP. Here, the 
estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in transfers would induce a loss of about 
70% of a standard deviation.  
 Finally, the lack of taxation index also has a positive influence, that is, raising the marginal 
income tax rate or expanding the share of the labour force paying this rate affects the level of 
opportunity entrepreneurship negatively. The estimate here suggests that a one standard deviation 
deterioration of the index would induce a loss of about 40% of a standard deviation. 
 Overall, we thus find that both the access to sound money and three different components of 
government size are strongly associated with national levels of opportunity entrepreneurship while 
sound money and one of the government indices are associated with necessity entrepreneurship. In 
the following, we discuss the potential reasons for these effects and their economic significance. 
DISCUSSION 
 First, we summarize the overall findings pertaining to government size in Figure 1, which 
reports the average level of entrepreneurial activity in the half of the sample with a small 
government sector and a large government sector, respectively. The figure also provides a “feel” for 
the size of the differences as the height of the columns are percent of the sample average. 
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Figure 1. Government and Entreprenurial Activity
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Exemplifying the Results 
 The figure provides an illustration of the economic significance of the size of government. If, 
for example, Denmark was to raise its current score on the government size index (3.75) to the 
average of the remaining four areas (8.5), it would raise its TEAOPP by about eight points. While 
this is quite clearly an overestimate by being more than two standard deviations of the TEAOPP 
variable – the GEM survey shows that only about 4.5% of the Danish population engage in 
entrepreneurship - it nevertheless indicates the substantial importance of having an oversize 
government sector. Differences in individuals’ access to sound money are also important but with 
about half the effect as that of the overall government index. 
 That government consumption has an effect on the level of necessity entrepreneurship should 
not be surprising, regardless of whether one holds a statist or classical-liberal view of the economy, 
as this variable includes both unemployment benefit expenditures and various public goods that, if 
not provided by the government, might entail a financial burned for the poor. However, the effect 
on opportunity entrepreneurship is approximately three times larger than that on necessity 
entrepreneurship. This finding clearly contradicts the popular claims by Scandinavian politicians, 
vigorously repeated in Southern European media, that the “welfare state” increases the economic 
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dynamism by protecting people from adverse effects of failing.11 Instead, the empirical findings 
rather clearly indicate that central traits of the welfare state – strong redistribution by either public 
goods, reflected in government consumption and public investments, or high marginal taxation – 
are all strongly negatively associated with opportunity entrepreneurship. 
 On a note of caution, it is important to stress that our results do not inform about the survival 
of firms resulting from entrepreneurial activities, only the likelihood of such activity occurring. It is 
therefore entirely possible that a casual examination of the cross-country differences in total 
entrepreneurial activity might overstate the benefits of entrepreneurship potentially available to 
single countries if there is either: 1) country-level decreasing marginal returns to total activity; or 2) 
that a higher level of activity also reflects a larger proportion of such activities failing. However, we 
must also stress that although entrepreneurial activity is probably a necessary condition for 
economic development, even in the Soviet Union under Stalin bureaucrats knew this fact and 
consequently allowed for some level of private initiative (Gregory and Harrison, 2005). Hence, the 
cross-country differences should neither be under- nor overestimated, but simply treated with the 
usual caution. 
Related Work 
 The present study forms part of the small literature on macroeconomic determinants of 
entrepreneurship as well as the much larger literature on economic freedom and economic growth. 
In this paper, we primarily take Kreft and Sobel’s (2005) US findings to a cross-country context, 
replicating one of their findings while producing another that probably by definition cannot be 
obtained in national comparisons as monetary policy is national by nature. First, we bring 
Henrekson’s (2005) thoughts on welfare state characteristics and entrepreneurship to a cross-
country test, which provides strong support for his theoretically valid notion that excessive 
government interventions and direct government activity in the economy crowds out private 
entrepreneurship. Naturally, we cannot say whether government size mainly affects the context in 
which potential entrepreneurs work and their incentives to unfold their entrepreneurial abilities, or 
whether systems with large governments instead mainly limit entrepreneurship by transforming 
norms and privately held beliefs about society.12 On the other hand, the finding that citizens’ access 
                                                 
11 See also Henreksson (2005) for an excellent analysis of how the welfare state (in casu: the Swedish welfare state) 
stifles incentives for entrepreneurship.   
12 While this to seem might seem a slightly farfetched possibility, it is worth stressing that QJE argue theoretically for 
the risk that welfare states can undermine citizens’ economic norms. Mokyr (2006) makes a similar argument that 
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to sound money, i.e. the existence of a consistent and predictable monetary policy, also adds to 
entrepreneurship cannot be ascribed to beliefs or incentives. Contrary to government size, it is an 
entirely contextual factor that limits prospective entrepreneurs’ access to financing their 
entrepreneurial endeavors. An inconsistent monetary policy will also tend to bring noise to the 
economic signals that Kirzner (1985) argues are crucial to the discovery of entrepreneurial options.  
 Our paper also provides an addition to the quite extensive literature on economic freedom. 
This literature has first and foremost demonstrated that aspects of economic freedom and other 
institutional measures are strongly associated with economic performance and economic growth 
(Grubel, 1998; Carlsson and Lundström, 2001; Berggren, 2003; de Haan et al., 2006). Whether this 
association comes about through the effects of economic freedom on factor accumulation or 
productivity growth is still uncertain. However, using a set of alternative institutional indices related 
to economic freedom, Méon and Weill (2006) find evidence suggesting that such factors are 
strongly related to total factor productivity. 
 Our study, holding its obvious limitations in mind, suggests that at least part of the association 
may come about through the effects of economic freedom on the degree of entrepreneurship and 
thus the dynamism in the economy. Here, both direct and indirect channels may be important. The 
standard policy focus is on high-tech entrepreneurial activity having companies such as Microsoft, 
Intel or Vestas as only a few obvious examples. Some firm start-ups may naturally end up as major 
international factors, and increased entrepreneurial activity resulting from increased economic 
freedom will probably increase the likelihood that such firms arise. As Mokyr (2006) emphasizes, 
for long-run growth to occur, sustained growth of knowledge and technology is necessary and that 
such growth comes about “because in each society, there are people who are creative and original, 
and motivated by some combination of greed, ambition, curiosity, and altruism”. It seems to us that 
Mokyr’s individual characteristics are stumblingly close to a standard definition of an entrepreneur, 
yet the main point of Mokyr’s chapter in the Handbook of Economic Growth is that these 
characteristics can only be employed fully in countries with the proper institutional framework, that 
is, in an environment of what would here be termed “economic freedom.” 
 Yet, it should also be stressed that entrepreneurial activity need not be of a sophisticated 
technological nature to add to economic performance. As stressed by Hayek (1968) many years ago, 
economic competition has important dynamic effects. Part of the effect of economic freedom on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
cultural beliefs played an important role in the Industrial Revolution, which was above anything else an entrepreneurial 
event. 
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growth could therefore arise from more mundane reasons, for example if new firms increase the 
competition in product markets or in the production of factor inputs and intermediate goods. Given 
that economic freedom, through its effects on entrepreneurial activity, increases the competition and 
efficiency in intermediate goods markets, it could also result in improved efficiency in the 
production of final goods and thereby in improved economic performance. 
 As such, while we must stress that there are considerable limits to which conclusions one can 
derive from cross-country empirical work consisting of only 29 countries, the findings in this paper 
are both easily interpreted within standard theory of entrepreneurship, which it provides a test of, as 
well as fitting within a broader and much more extensive literature on economic freedom. With the 
necessary qualifications in mind, we therefore outline the conclusions and discuss implications in 
the final section. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 To sum up, the contribution of this work is to report a set of cross-country tests of the relation 
between entrepreneurship and economic freedom, basing our findings on existing theoretical 
literature. As such, we follow in the footsteps of Kreft and Sobel (2005) who show that across the 
states of the USA, the level of entrepreneurial activity is significantly associated with economic 
freedom. We find that both the size of government and the quality of the monetary policy are strong 
determinants of entrepreneurship across a small sample of 29 countries for which there are 
comparable data on entrepreneurship. The access to sound money appears to be critical to both 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. On the other hand, only governments’ share in total 
consumption affects necessity entrepreneurship while both government consumption, transfers and 
subsidies and the extent of taxation are negatively associated with opportunity entrepreneurship. 
Holding the limitations of our paper in mind, we must conclude that these findings identify what 
may be costs of a lack of economic freedom that are not often discussed in the literature. 
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